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REGULATION OF INTERMODAL RATE
COMPETITION IN TRANSPORTATION
Joseph R. Rose*
efforts by railroads to reduce the control exercised by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) over rates
applicable to competition among different modes of transport have
precipitated perhaps the most acrimonious controversy in transport
regulation since World War II. The railroads have vigorously
pressed their arguments on the Commission, the courts, and the
Congress. They have had the support of two Presidents,1 two Secretaries of Commerce,2 the Department of Transportation,3 and the
weight of academic opinion.4 Yet thus far they have failed to
effect a change in either the Commission's policy or the law governing it; and the Supreme Court has twice dealt inconclusively with
the issues. 5
The controversy over intermodal rate competition comprehends
both legal and economic issues. Clarity requires that each be explicitly stated and separately treated. The legal issues center on the
meaning of section 15a(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act6 and
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1. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM OF OUR NATION, April 5, 1962, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 348, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 124
(1966); ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 28, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112
(1969).
2. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT POLICY AND ORGANIZATION, REVISION OF FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY (1955) (Weeks Report); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS (1960) (Mueller Report).
3. Statements submitted by Paul N. Cherington, Assistant Secretary for Policy and
International Affairs, and his successor Charles D. Baker on January 30 and April 30,
1970, respectively, before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission)
in Rules To Govern the Assembling &: Presenting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298
(1970) [hereinafter Docket No. 34013].
4. See, e.g., Baumol, et al., The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad
Services, 35 U. CHI. J. Bus. 357 (1962) [hereinafter Baumol]; Baumol, et al., Statement
of Clarification, 36 U. CHI. J. Bus. 348 (1963) [hereinafter Baumol, Clarification]. Both
of these publications were prepared jointly by ten academic economists under the
auspices of the Association of American Railroads.
5. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968)
[hereinafter Ingot Molds]; ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963) [hereinafter New Haven].
6. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964), formerly Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 6, 72 Stat. 572 (1958),
For studies prior to 1958, see E. '\\TII.LIAMS, THE REGULATION OF RAIL-MOTOR RATE
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the declaration of the National Transportation Policy that precedes
the Act, 7 which are the sources of the Commission's authority. The
economic issues involve the effect on resource allocation of ratemaking proposals devised to carry out these provisions of the Act.

I.

THE LEGAL ISSUES

Section 15a(3), added to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1958,
states that "[i]n a proceeding involving competition between carriers
of different modes of transportation subject to this Act, the Commission, in determining whether a rate is lower than a reasonable
minimum rate, shall consider the facts and circumstances attending
the movement of the traffic by the carrier . . . to which the rate is
applicable" and that "[r]ates of a carrier shall not be held up to
a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national
transportation policy declared in this Act." 8 The National Transportation Policy provides, inter alia, for the
fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject
to the • . . Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantages of each; . . . all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water,
highway, and rail, as well as other means adequate to meet the needs
of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of
the national defense. 9
COMPETITION (1958); Bigham, Regulation of Minimum Rates in Transportation, 61
ECON, 173 (1947).

Q.J.

7. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch.
722, tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 899).
8. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964). Section 15a(3) applies only to competition among
regulated modes; it does not apply to competition between regulated and unregulated
carriers. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 593
(1968). Rate-making, when the competing carrier is unregulated, is governed by § 1(5)
of the Act, which provides that rates shall be "just and reasonable." A just and reasonable rate is "compensatory" (Limestone in Trainloads from Prairie du Rocher, Ill.
to Baton Rouge, La., 313 I.C.C. 71, 86 (1960)), which means that it must be in excess
of "out-of-pocket" cost (ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 748 (1963)). See
note 18 infra. The Commission has stated, "While rates which exceed out-of-pocket
costs by only slight margins have been approved when required by special circumstances, the Commission has never taken the view that any particular margin must
be set. Logic dictates that each rate must be judged in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding it." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 I.C.C. 589,
596 (1967). For illustrations of "special circumstances," see Grain in Multiple-Car
Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 318 I.C.C. 641, 684, revd., 321 I.C.C. 582
(1963), revd. sub nom. Cincinnati, N.O. &: T.P. Ry. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 572
(S.D. Ohio 1964), vacated and remanded sub nom. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati,
N.O.T.P. Ry., 379 U.S. 642, affd. on remand, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965); Coal from Southern
Mines to Tampa and Sutton, Fla., 318 I.C.C. 371, 386 (1962).
9. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1964).
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The Supreme Court, construing section 15a(3) for the first time
in ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. (New Haven), 10 declared that
the principal reason for the reference in that section to the National
Transportation Policy "was to emphasize the power of the Commission to prevent the railroads from destroying or impairing the inherent advantages of other modes," 11 and it decided that the "initial
determination" of which mode had the inherent advantages must
be made by the Commission.12 The Act does not define "inherent
advantages"; in New Haven the Court casually mentioned "cost and
service" advantages but failed to define those terms.13 The concept
of "service advantage" has occasioned little controversy,14 but the
search for the proper definition of "cost advantage" now constitutes
the basic legal issue in proceedings under section 15a(3).
A. The Commission's Policy

According to the Commission, service advantage is measured by
comparing shipper costs associated with particular transport services.15 Shipper costs include such expenses as are incurred by shippers for loading, unloading, drayage, and breakage; they also include
inventory costs, which are often their most important ingredient.
The Commission regards the carrier that requires the smaller shipping costs as the mode of transport with the service advantage.16
Cost advantage, on the other hand, is derived by comparing carrier costs of the competing modes of transport; 17 and the recurring
legal controversy has centered on determining the proper method of
measuring carrier cost for use in the comparative equation. The
IO. 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
11. 372 U.S. at 758.
12. 372 U.S. at 763-64.
13. 372 U.S. at 755-56, 759.
14. The concept of service advantage is not directly relevant to the task of ratemaking. Service advantage is for practical purposes a demand factor, with which the
regulatory authority should not concern itself in determining inherent advantage. If
rates reflect differences in carriers' marginal costs (see notes 70 &: 71 infra and accompanying text and pt. II. B. 2. infra), and shippers select the mode that minimizes
their total transport costs, traffic tends to be economically allocated.
15. Fresh Meats, Transcontinental, Westbound, 309 I.C.C. 529, 535, 544 (1960);
Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 309 I.C.C. 347, 353 (1960). The
Commission found service differences between two modes minimal in Motor Vehicles
from Kansas City to Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas, 318 I.C.C. 301, 319-20 (1962). See
also J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON &: C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN
THE TRANSPORTATION lNDUsrRIES 189-90 (1959).
16. Cement within Southern Territory &: from Hagerstown, Md., to the South, 319
I.C.C. 465, 471, 475 (1963).
17. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 83 (1965). See also Docket No.
M013, supra note 3.

1014

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:1011

Commission has generally used fully distributed costs rather than
out-of-pocket costs as the appropriate standard18 and has regarded
the carrier with the lower fully distributed cost as the mode with
the cost advantage.19
18. "Out-of-pocket" and "fully distributed" costs were the terms employed by the
ICC until its disposition of the rule-making proceeding in Docket No. 34013, supra
note 3. In that proceeding, the Commission decided to substitute for that terminology
"variable" and "fuIIy allocated" costs respectively, which were given slightly different
meanings.
Out-of-pocket costs included "80% of freight operating expenses, rents and taxes
(excluding Federal income taxes) plus a return of 4 percent after Federal income taxes
on 50 percent of the road property and 100 percent of the equipment used in freight
service." ICC, BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS STATEMENT No. 2-68, RAIL CARLOAD COST SCALES BY
TERRITORIES FOR THE YEAR 1966, at 4 (1968). The Commission regarded 80% as the measure of cost variability (elasticity). Id. For an explanation of the procedure to determine
variability, see ICC, BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS STA'IEMENT No. 7-63, ExPLANATION OF RAu.
COST FINDING PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE USE OF COSTS clI. 2 (1963).
FuIIy distributed costs included "in addition to the out-of-pocket costs as described
above, aII other revenue needs necessary to permit the carriers to cover the remaining
20 percent of the freight operating expenses, rents, and taxes, the passenger-train and
less-carload operating deficits and a return of 4 percent after Federal income taxes on
the remaining property." STATEMENT No. 2-68, supra at 4.
In Docket No. 34013, the Commission, inter alia, adopted new cost terminology. It
found that "[t]he terms 'out-of-pocket costs' and 'fully distributed costs,' as used in
Commission proceedings, should be changed to 'variable costs' and 'fuIIy allocated costs,'
respectively, and the noncost elements of profit, income taxes, and for railroads, the
passenger and less-than-carload deficits, should be excluded therefrom." 337 I.C.C. at
326. The Commission also made a change in the determination of the "variability factor." It found that "[t]he determination of a variability factor for particular services
requires the selection of an appropriate time period whiclI is sufficiently long to reflect
adequately those clianges in operations re5ulting in expenses whiclI can reasonably be
expected to vary with the performance of the particular service or services rendered."
337 I.C.C. at 326.
It should be noted that the Commission in this rule-making proceeding explicitly
refused to adopt any criterion of inherent cost advantage. The Examiner had recommended that "(7) inherent cost advantages should generally be protected through the
approval of prescription of rate differentials, measured by the difference between the
respective fully allocated cost levels of competing modes of transportation, when the
involved rates are shown to be below suclI levels." Docket No. 34013, Examiners'
Recommended Report and Order 123 (Oct. 10, 1966). The Commission declared that
it would consider "matters relating to recommended finding No. 7 (dealing with inherent cost advantages as between competing modes)" in related proceedings in Cost
Standards in lntermodal Rate Proceedings, Docket No. 34013 (Sub-No. 1), which will
be the subject of a separate report. 337 I.C.C. at 301. The latter proceeding was not
initiated until February 5, 1969, almost seven years after the inception of Docket No.
34013 and more than six months after the decision in Ingot Molds. In that case, the
Supreme Court refused to decide the issue of cost advantage until the Commission
made an "initial determination," whiclI the Court obviously expected in Docket No.
34013. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
19. In tlie absence of evidence of fuIIy distributed costs, the Commission has used
out-of-pocket costs as the measure of cost advantage. Automobile Lamps &: Alcoholic
Liquors, Pennsylvania to Texas &: Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 335, 338 (1963). For a full
discussion of the Commission's conception of cost advantage, see Grain in Multiple-Car
Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 321 I.C.C. 582, 596-604 (1963), modified on
other grounds, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965) (discussed in note 8 supra). The Commission
decided tliat in determining "inherent" cost advantage, public expenditures on the
domestic-waterway system should not be attributed to the water carriers.
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In proceedings involving railroad rates reduced to meet the competition of water carriers, the evidence typically shows that water
carriers have the cost advantage and railroads have the service advantage.20 In cases that involve competition between railroads and motor
carriers, the evidence usually shows that when the railroad service
is performed by conventional freight cars the railroads have the cost
advantage and the motor carriers have the service advantage; 21 when
railroad service involves such improved facilities as trailer-on-flat
cars (TOFC), however, cost and service advantages may be equally
divided bet1veen the two modes.~ 2
Before New Haven, the Commission did not commonly make an
explicit "initial finding" of inherent advantage in proceedings under
section 15a(3). Its policy, generally, was to maintain railroad minimum rates at a level that enabled regulated water and motor carriers
to compete with railroads at rates covering the nonrail carriers' fully
distributed costs.23 Railroad rates below such a minimum were condemned by the Commission as "destructive competition" even when
they exceeded the railroads' fully distributed costs. 24 Thus, railroad
rates were required to be differentially above the approved rates of
competing water carriers-that is, above the water carriers' fully distributed costs; 25 similarly, the Commission approved railroad rates
20. See, e.g., American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville&: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571,
575-76 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory, 309 I.C.C. 347,
353 (1960). Occasionally, however, the Commission finds the service advantages equally
divided between rail and motor. Exceptions Ratings on Agricultural, Roadmaking, and
Other Articles, 315 I.C.C. 9, 14 (1961), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1962).
22. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles from Kansas City to Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas,
318 I.C.C. 301, 319 (1962). Service differences were there found to be minimal, but
trailer-on-flat-car [hereinafter TOFC] rail service had the lower costs. In rate-making
proceedings, motor carriers often fail to introduce evidence of their costs. Paint &: Related Articles in Official Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 448 (1959).
23. Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 49 (1960) [hereinafter PanAtlantic], revd., New York, N.H. &: H.R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn.
1961), remanded to ICC, ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
24. 313 ICC at 47. See also note 25 infra.
25. In Pan-Atlantic, tl1e leading case, the ICC condemned as destructive competition railroad rates that had been reduced to the level of competing coastwise water
carrier rates. Although there was evidence of record to support a finding of cost
advantage in favor of the coastwise water carriers, the Commission did not make
such a finding. All of the railroad rates were compensatory and most of them were
above fully distributed costs. The ICC declared that, under the circumstances, the
railroad rates should be 6% higher than the competing water rates. 313 I.C.C. at 50.
Before Pan-Atlantic, the Commission had rarely found railroad rates unlawful
under § 15a(3). It distinguished the earlier cases from Pan-Atlantic on the ground
that in those cases the reduced rates did not threaten to cause successive rate reductions-tllat is, rate wars. The ICC cited the following proceedings in which it had
approved reduced railroad rates, whether the rates covered fully distributed costs or
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differentially below the rates or fully distributed costs of competing
merely out-of-pocket costs: Magnesium from Velasco, Tex. to East St. Louis, Ill.,
309 I.C.C. 659 (1960), revg. 306 I.C.C. 45 (1959); Lumber from California &: Oregon
to California &: Arizona, 308 I.C.C. 345 (1959); Paint &: Related Articles in Official
Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439 (1959); Sugar to Ohio River Crossings, 308 I.C.C. 167 (1959),
revd., 315 I.C.C. 521 (1962), affd. on rehearing, 319 I.C.C. 782 (1963). The Commission
also had approved reduced railroad rates in Export Soybeans from Southwest &: South
to Gulf Ports, 309 I.C.C. 445 (1960) (in which the reduced railroad rates were com•
pensatory but greatly in excess of competing barge rates); Pig Iron from Ashland, Ky.,
to Kansas City, Mo., 310 I.C.C. 641 (1960), (in which some of the reduced railroad
rates covered fully distributed costs and others were merely compensatory); and Paper
from St. Francisville, La. to Chicago, Ill., 306 I.C.C. 703 (1959) (no differential above
water rates required because of the high level of both rail and water rates). See also
Iron or Steel Slabs from Cincinnati, Ohio &: Newport, Ky. to Riverdale, Ill., 308 I.C.C.
151 (1959); Synthetic Resin from New York Area, 305 I.C.C. 5 (1958); Tinplate from
St. Louis Group to Texas, 304 I.C.C. 473 (1958). In Roofing or Siding from the Twin
Cities to South Dakota, 308 I.C.C. 278 (1959), the Commission approved "fully compensatory" motor rates below the competing railroad rates; and in Class Rates from
Chicago, Ill. to Texas, 308 I.C.C. 467 (1958), it held compensatory freight fonvarder
and motor carrier rates lawful under § 15a(3).
Only one pre-Pan-Atlantic case was found in which the Commission disapproved
railroad rates under § 15a(3). In Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory,
309 I.C.C, 347 (1960), railroad rates covering fully distributed costs were held unlawful
on the ground they would reduce earnings on high-grade traffic.
After Pan-Atlantic, the Commission did not again discuss § 15a(3) at length until
Various Commodities from or to Arkansas&: Texas, 314 I.C.C. 215 (1961). The material
facts of Various Commodities were similar to those in Pan-Atlantic, except that the
coastwise water carriers did not present evidence of their costs. The Commission approved the reduced railroad rates, holding that they could not be considered destructive competition in the absence of cost evidence. It is noteworthy that the railroad
rates in Various Commodities were merely compensatory while those in Pan-Atlantic
for the most part covered fully distributed costs. But following Pan-Atlantic, the Com•
mission generally continued to reject reduced railroad rates regardless of cost advantage.
Paint or Varnish Driers from East to Southwest, 313 I.C.C. 719, 722 (1961) (railroad
rates required to be somewhat less than 6% above water rates because the railroad
service was performed with box cars rather than TOFC as in Pan-Atlantic); Pig Iron
from Neville Island, Pa. to Louisville, Ky., 313 I.C.C. 771, 779 (1961), revd., Pennsylvania
R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (ICC disapproved a railroad
rate below the total cost to the shipper of using a competing rail-water-rail service
and required the railroad rate to be equal to such total cost). In only one proceeding
during this period did the Commission, in holding a competing railroad rate unlawful,
make a finding of cost advantage in favor of a water carrier. In Newsprint Paper from
Tennessee &: Alabama to Houston, Tex., 313 I.C.C. 669, 674 (1961), the Commission
required a railroad rate to exceed the water carrier's fully distributed costs by 10%,
In Electric Wire &: Cable from Eastern Origins to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 71, 74 (1961),
the Commission condemned the railroad rate with the statement that "the evidence
is convincing that Seatrain [the water competitor] is the low cost carrier," but established no differential in its favor.
Even after Various Commodities, the Commission persisted in following Pan-Atlantic
and in condemning railroad rates as destructive competition without findings of cost
advantage. Agricultural Insecticides in Tank Cars from Heyden, N.J. to Houston, Tex.,
315 I.C.C. 623 (1962), revd., 319 I.C.C. 493 (1963); Sugar from the South to Indiana,
Ohio River &: Intermediate Points, 315 I.C.C. 521 (1962), revd., 319 I.C.C. 782 (1963);
Plastics from Texas to the East, 314 I.C.C. 347 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 379 (1963);
Commodities in Trailers on Flatcars, East to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 423 (1961); DDT from
Avon, Pa. to Points in Texas, 314 I.C.C. 453 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 431 (1963);
Garden Hose&: Electric Cable from New Jersey or Rhode Island to Points in Texas,
314 I.C.C. 515 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 227 (1963); Cereal, Coffee, Tea, Drugs, Related
Articles from New Jersey &: Pennsylvania to Texas, 314 I.C.C. 734 (1961), revd., 319
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motor carriers.26 The differential in the former case was to be large
enough to compensate for the railroads' service advantage and in the
latter just low enough to compensate for the motor carriers' service
advantage.
The Commission based its policy of maintaining the rates of water
and motor carriers at the level of fully distributed costs on those
carriers' need to recover such costs in order to continue their operaI.C.C. 424 (1963); Electric Cable &: Wire from Worcester, Mass. to Houston, Tex.,
314 I.C.C. 743 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 390 (1963). The Commission condemned reduced
railroad rates on the ground that they would dissipate needed revenues on high-value
traffic. Pig Iron from Buffalo, N.Y. to Chicago, Ill. &: Gary, Ind., 315 I.C.C. 601 (1962);
Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire l'.: New York to Texas&: Louisiana, 315 I.C.C.
124 (1961), revd., 319 I.C.C. 396 (1963). The reversals by the Commission came after
the Supreme Court's decision in New Haven.
Various Commodities was first cited in Canned Goods from Eastern Points to Pacific
Coast, 315 I.C.C. 757, 761 (1962), in which the Commission said the evidence must show
"which is the low cost mode" in order to sustain a claim of destructive competition.
Thus, reduced railroad rates were approved in the absence of evidence showing the
protestant to be the low-cost mode in ·wool from Norfolk &: Newport News, Va. to
Charleston, S.C., 316 I.C.C. 109 (1962); Newsprint Paper from Tennessee &: Alabama
to Baton Rouge, La., 315 I.C.C. 117 (1961). Compensatory railroad rates were upheld
in Canned or Preserved Foodstuffs from Pacific Coast to Gulf Ports for Export, 314
I.C.C. 569 (1961), without discussion of cost advantage, for situations where the railroad
rates would have no material effect on competing water carriers. Similarly, compensatory railroad rates were approved without mention of Various Commodities in Canned
Goods from Pacific Coast to Eastern Points, 315 I.C.C. 769 (1962). In Phosphate Rock
from Florida to Southwestern &: Western Trunkline Territories, 316 I.C.C. 207 (1962), the
Commission approved compensatory railroad rates where the railroad had the cost
advantage on some routes and the competing rail-motor-rail service had the cost advan•
tage on others.

26. For a clear demonstration of the Commission's method, see Fresh Meats, Transcontinental, Westbound, 309 I.C.C. 529 (1960). In these early cases, the Commission
disapproved railroad rates when it foun,l "destructive competition" even if the rail
rates covered fully distributed costs. See, e.g., Cigars from Jacksonville to Kansas City,
313 I.C.C. 633 (1961), revd. sub nom. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v. United States, 207
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Exceptions Ratings on Agricultural, Roadmaking, and
Other Articles, 315 I.C.C. 9 (1961), revd. sub nom. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States,
203 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Tobacco from North Carolina to Central Territory,
309 I.C.C. 347 (1960).
Prior to New Haven, however, the Commission generally approved railroad rates
that had been reduced to meet motor-carrier competition. Synthetic Resin from New
York Area, 305 I.C.C. 5 (1958). In Gasoline &: Fuel Oil from Friendship, N.C. to
Virginia &: West Virginia, 305 I.C.C. 673 (1959), the Commission approved railroad rates,
covering fully distributed costs, that were calculated to divide the traffic with motor
carriers whose rates also covered fully distributed costs. But the agency also approved
compensatory railroad rates when the evidence indicated that motor carriers could
compete at their existing rates. See, e.g., Paint and Related Articles in Official Territory,
308 I.C.C. 439 (1959). After Various Commodities, compensatory rates for TOFC service
were approved when both railroads and motor carriers failed to offer evidence of
fully distributed costs. Meats, Fruits, Vegetables-TOFC-Transcontinental, 316 I.C.C.
585 (1962). And compensatory TOFC rates were upheld although they threatened to
divert traffic from competing motor carriers. Motor Vehicles from Kansas City to
Arkansas, Louisiana &: Texas, 318 I.C.C. 301 (1962). See also Middlewest Motor Freight
Bureau v. Great Northern R.R., 316 I.C.C. 443 (1962); Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers
Assn., Inc. v. Baltimore &: O.R:.R., 314 I.C.C. 5 (1961). Thus, the Commission appeared
to encourage the TOFC service.
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tions. A railroad ordinarily serves numerous markets. In some markets the demand for railroad services is relatively inelastic and a rail
carrier is thus able to maintain rates at a level substantially above full
costs. Absent regulation, therefore, a railroad can afford to cut rates
below its full cost in those markets in which it encounters intermodal
competition and in which the demand for its services is relatively
elastic, because these losses can be recovered in inelastic markets.
A water or motor carrier, on the other hand, normally operates in a
more restricted area and serves fewer markets. If such a carrier is
compelled to establish rates below its full costs in some markets, it
may not have other, less competitive, markets in which it can make
up the deficits. As a result, the motor or water carrier may be forced
out of business with its "inherent advantages" destroyed, contrary to
the objectives of the National Transportation Policy.27
After New Haven, the Commission rarely found reduced railroad
rates to constitute destructive competition. It upheld rates covering
the railroads' fully distributed costs regardless of cost advantage and
regardless of such rates' effect on competitors' traffic. 28 Reversing
earlier decisions, the Commission approved compensatory railroad
rates in the absence of proof that objecting carriers had the cost
advantage. 29 The agency also approved compensatory railroad rates
27. See Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23 (1960), revd., New York,
N.H. &: H.R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), remanded to ICC,
ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
28. In Volume Class Rates, Transcontinental Territory, 325 I.C.C. 735, 740 (1965),
in ·which the lawfulness of motor carrier rates covering fully distributed costs was in
issue, the Commission said: "[W]e may condemn reduced rates which cover fully
distributed costs, including a reasonable profit, only in the most compelling circumstances." Perhaps such compelling circumstances were presented in New Haven, in
which the Supreme Court said: "To justify such a result [the rejection of reduced
rates], we believe it must be demonstrated that the proposed rates in themselves
genuinely threaten the continued existence of a transportation service that is uniquely
capable of filling a transcendent national defense or other public need." 372 U.S.
at 762 (emphasis added).
No case has been discovered after New Haven in which the Commission found that
railroad rates that returned fully distributed costs constituted destructive competition.
See, e.g., Candy &: Confectionery-New Jersey, New York &: Pennsylvania to Texas,
321 I.C.C. 154, 158-59 (1963), in which the railroad had the cost advantage on some
services and the water carrier competitors had the cost advantage on others. To the
same effect, see Magazines or Periodicals from Miami, Fla. to Derby-Shelton, Conn.,
319 I.C.C. 340,342 (1963); Alcoholic Liquors from Maryland, New Jersey &: Pennsylvania
to Florida, 319 I.C.C. 323, 326-27 (1963). In Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire
&: New York to Texas &: Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396, 398 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 124
(1961), the Commission said: "The rates substantially exceed full costs and represent
a proper exercise of managerial discretion in seeking to increase volume and revenue."
The Commission noted incidentally that the water carrier protestant did not submit
evidence to establish cost advantage. 319 I.C.C. at 398.
29. In several cases, compensatory railroad rates were held lawful when protesting
motor carriers failed to introduce evidence of their own costs. See, e.g., Freight, All
Kinds, Southern &: IFA Territories, 323 I.C.C. 730, 739 (1965); Garden Hose &: Electric

May 1971]

Intermodal Rate Competition

1019

when they exceeded the protesting carriers' rates and fully distributed costs30 and when protestants failed to prove that such rates
"impaired" their ability to obtain traffic at "profitable" levels.31
In Ingot Molds, Pennsylvania to Steelton, Kentucky (Ingot
1'.folds),32 however, the Commission rejected a compensatory railroad
rate that was equal to a competing water carrier rate but below the
Cable from New Jersey or Rhode Island to Points in Texas, 319 I.C.C. 227, 229 (1963),
revg. 314 I.C.C. 515 (1961); Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire & New York
to Texas & Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396, 398 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 124 (1961);
Aluminum Articles from Sandow, Tex. to Pennsylvania & New Jersey, 319 I.C.C. 431,
444 (1963), revg. 314 I.C.C. 453 (1961); Steel Bars from Lemont, Ill. to Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Minnesota & Nebraska, 319 I.C.C. 292, 306 (1963); Iron or Steel Articles-East to Southwest, 321 I.C.C. 419, 425 (1963), vacating order of suspension in 310 I.C.C.
587 (1960); Cement Within Southern Territory & from Hagerstown, Md. to the South,
319 I.C.C. 465, 479 (1963). To the same effect, see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 326 I.C.C. 708, 712 (1966); Cottonseed Oil, Shreveport La., & Texas to Texas
Ports, 322 I.C.C. 93, 97 (1964), revd., 323 I.C.C. 698 (1965).
A rate is regarded as compensatory when "it is greater than the out•of-pocket cost
of the service for which the rate is set." American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 578 n.8 (1968). See also note 8 supra.
30. See, e.g., Grain from Idaho, Oregon & Washington to Ports in Oregon &
Washington, 326 I.C.C. 358 (1966), revg. 319 I.C.C. 534 (1963). In that case, the Commission said: "Clearly rates may be established at levels below fully distributed costs
where, as here, there is a competitive necessity to do so. And where the rates of a
proponent carrier are above the rates and fully distributed costs of a competitor
we have no basis for concluding that a destructive competitive practice has occurred."
326 I.C.C. at 366. When a nonregulated carrier was a major source of competition,
the Commission had approved compensatory railroad rates below the fully distributed
costs of another regulated carrier that had the cost advantage and that competed to
some extent for the traffic. Wine, Pacific Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167 (1966), affg.
326 I.C.C. 119 (1965). See also Grain in Multiple-Car Shipments-River Crossings to
the South, 325 I.C.C. 752, 774 (1965), affg. 318 I.C.C. 641 (1963).
31. The Commission apparently considers that a profitable rate is one that covers
fully distributed costs. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 I.C.C. 589,
596-97 (1967); Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 82 (1965), revd. sub nom.
Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967), revd. sub nom.
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968); Wrought
Pipe to the Southwest, 319 I.C.C. 310, 317-18 (1963), modifying 251 I.C.C. 405 (1942);
Automobile Lamps & Alcoholic Liquors from Pennsylvania to Texas & Louisiana, 319
I.C.C. 335, 338 (1963); Magazines or Periodicals from Miami, Fla. to Derby-Shelton,
Conn., 319 I.C.C. 340, 342 (1963); Agricultural Insecticides in Tank Cars from Heyden,
N.J. to Houston, Tex., 319 I.C.C. 493, 495 (1963), revg. 315 I.C.C. 623 (1962); Cereal,
Coffee, Tea, Drugs, Related Articles from New Jersey & Pennsylvania to Texas, 319
I.C.C. 424, 425 (1963); Candy & Confectionery-New Jersey, New York & Pennsylvania
to Texas, 321 I.C.C. 154, 159 (1963); Export Grain &: Grain Products-WTL to Gulf &
Lake Ports, 319 I.C.C. 729, 743 (1963), affd., 321 I.C.C. 88 (1963); Pig Iron from Buffalo,
N.Y. to Chicago, Ill. & Gary, Ind., 321 I.C.C. 121, 128-30 (1963), revg. in part 315 I.C.C.
601 (1961); Plastics from Texas to the East, 319 I.C.C. 379, 381 (1963); Electric Cable
&: Wire from Worcester, Mass. to Houston, Tex., 314 I.C.C. 743, 744 (1961), revd.,
319 I.C.C. 390 (1963). For cases to the same effect in which railroads protested reduced
rates of other railroads, see Iron Ore, Cleveland, Ohio to Ohio & Pennsylvania, 323
I.C.C, 746 (1965); Rail-Water, Grain in Bulk, Missouri, Illinois & Indiana to Buffalo,
N.Y., 319 I.C.C. 123 (1963), revd. on other grounds, 321 I.C.C. 564 (1963).
32. !126 I.C.C. 77 (1965), revd. sub nom. Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F.
Supp. 71 (\V.D. Ky. 1967), revd. sub nom. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968).
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fully distributed costs of the water carrier. In that case, the water
carrier had the lower folly distributed costs and the railroad the
lower out-of-pocket costs; the Commission found that the railroad
was likely to deprive the water carrier of its traflic.33 Using fully
distributed costs as the proper criterion of cost advantage, the Commission condemned the railroad rate as destructive competition.3 i
The central legal issue in Ingot Molds, however-whether fully
distributed (fully allocated) or out-of-pocket (variable) costs or
neither should be the measure of cost advantage-was not decided
by the Supreme Court and remains unresolved. 35
B. The Railroads' Position
The railroads favor out-of-pocket cost as the criterion of inherent advantage; they argue that fully distributed costs lack rational
justification and that the Commission misinterprets section 15a(3)
and the National Transportation Policy. According to the railroads,
the Commission has failed to explain why fully distributed costs
should be the touchstone of inherent advantage or why the mode
of transport with the lower fully distributed costs should be considered the more efficient one. They assert that the comparison of
out-of-pocket, or incremental, costs is the only rational way to regulate competitive rates.36
Congress, according to the railroads, intended the concept of
"inherent advantages" to refer to situations in which one mode of
transportation can operate with lower out-of-pocket costs than can
others.87 Under the Act, such a mode must be allowed to "assert"
its advantage by reducing rates to the level of its out-of-pock.et costs,
if such a reduction is necessary to obtain traffic. By using fully
distributed costs as the standard of cost advantage, the Commission
has elevated railroad rates to a level that enables competing modes
to obtain traffic at rates covering their fully distributed costs and
thus violates the provision in section 15a(3) that rates "shall not be
held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other
mode.'' 38
33.
34.
35.
36.

326 I.C.C. at 80.
326 I.C.C. at 83-85.
See notes 42-66 infra and accompanying text.
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 8e N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 577
(1962). The case for the railroads is most fully and effectively stated in the Baumol
articles cited in note 4 supra. See also Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77,
78 (1965).

37. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 8e N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 582
n.I 0 (1968).
38. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964).
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At the same time, the railroads claim the right to price their
services so as to maximize their net revenues, subject to regulatory
restraints. These restraints would include requirements that minimum rates not fall below out-of-pocket costs, that maximum rates
not exceed reasonable levels to be determined by the Commission,
and that aggregate railroad earnings be limited to a "fair return." 39
C. The Position of the Supreme Court
In New Haven, the Commission decided that the railroad rates
involved, which had been reduced to the level of competing watercarrier rates and which threatened to deprive water carriers of their
traffic, constituted destructive competition.40 Because the Commission declined to make a finding on the issue of cost advantage, the
Supreme Court reversed; 41 but the Court indicated no preference
between fully distributed and out-of-pocket costs as the criterion of
cost advantage.
In Ingot Molds, the Commission also condemned railroad rates
as destructive competition, but explicitly found that the water carrier had the cost advantage. 42 On review, therefore, it appeared that
the Court was directly confronted with the task of interpreting section 15a(3) and the National Transportation Policy. But, surprisingly, the Court held otherwise.
Ingot Molds involved the following facts. From 1953 until 1968,
ingot molds were shipped from Neville Island and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania to Steelton, Kentucky almost exclusively by combination barge-truck service; since 1960 the total charge for the service
had been $5.11 per ton. In 1963, the Pennsylvania and the Louisville & Nashville railroads lowered their joint rate for the same
traffic from $11.86 to $5.11 per ton. The competing barge lines protested to the Commission that the new railroad rate violated section
15a(3) and the National Transportation Policy because it destroyed
the "inherent advantage" of the barge-truck service.43
The Commission made the following findings of fact, which
were not in real dispute.44 The railroads' fully distributed costs were
39. Baumol, supra note 4.
40. Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 47 (1960). See discussion
of the ICC opinion in note 25 supra.
41. ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 760-61 (1963).
42. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 84 (1965).
43. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571, 572
(1968).
44. 392 U.S. at 572.
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$7.59 per ton and their out-of-pocket costs were $4.69 per ton. The
railroad rate was therefore unquestionably compensatory. The fully
distributed costs of the barge-truck service amounted to $5.19 per
ton, which was substantially less than the fully distributed costs of
the railroads. The barge-truck out-of-pocket costs, although not
separately computed, were stipulated to be higher than the railroads' out-of-pocket costs. From the shipper's viewpoint, price was
the most important determinant in selecting a mode of transport;
but because of service advantages, all the traffic would go to the
railroads if the rates were equal.
The Commission decided that the barge-truck movement had the
inherent cost advantage45 and that the railroads "by reducing [their]
rate be~ow the level of the barge-truck full costs •.. [had] unlawfully
impinged upon the ability of the barge-truck mode competitively
to assert its inherent cost advantage." 46 The Commission concluded
that the railroad rate was "unjust and unreasonable, and in contravention of the national transportation policy."47 On review, a threejudge panel sitting in the United States District for the Western
District of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Commission, holding (1) that the Commission's order failed to state a rational basis
for the use of fully distributed costs as the criterion of inherent
advantage and (2) that the order was inconsistent with the congressional intent in enacting section 15a(3), which was to establish
out-of-pocket costs as the standard of inherent advantage.48
The Supreme Court, in American Commercial Lines, Incorporated v. Louisville & N.R.R. (Ingot Molds), 49 reversed the decision of
the district court and gave directions to affirm the Commission's
order. It disposed of the lower court's first holding by asserting that
it "must logically follow" the second holding, "since, if Congress in
enacting that section had already decided that inherent advantage
should be determined by reference to fully distributed costs, there
would be no special burden on the Commission to justify its use of
them." 50 The Court then rejected the district court's second holding,
declaring that "at the very least, the result reached by the Commis45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See text accompanying note 42 supra.
Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77, 85 (1965).
326 I.C.C. at 85.
Louisville &: N.R.R. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71, 75-76
392 U.S. 571 (1968).
392 U.S. at 579.

r,v.D.

Ky. 1967).
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sion here is presumptively in accord with the language of the statute
and with the intent of Congress in utilizing that language."51
But the Court did not decide that section 15a(3) required the
"ICC to use fully distributed costs as the only measure of inherent
advantage in intermodal rate controversies." 52 The Court said that
"[a]11 we hold here is that the initial determination of that question
[cost advantage] is for the Commission." 53 It construed the Commission's finding of cost advantage in the case as "temporary" and
declared that the Commission had authority to develop "a general
standard of costing to use in determining inherent advantage in
situations involving intermodal competition in the broad context
of a rule-making proceeding" such as the proceeding that was pending in Rules To Govern the Assembling and Presenting of Cost
Evidence (Docket Number 34013). 54 But at least prior to the consummation of that proceeding, the Commission was permitted to use
fully distributed costs as the standard for cost advantage.
Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion in New Haven,
concurred in the result reached in Ingot Molds and remarked that
the Court "leaves this important question [determining inherent
cost advantage] just where our decision of five years ago in the New
Haven case left it, and new litigation will now be necessary to resolve the issue." 55 New litigation may be necessary, but Ingot Molds
did not leave the "important question" exactly where New Haven
left it. As the majority in Ingot Molds recognized, "[N]othing in the
language of the New Haven opinion indicates a preference for either
out-of-pocket or fully distributed costs as a measure of inherent advantage•••." 56 In Ingot Molds, however, the cumulative effect of the
Court's language reveals a preference for fully distributed costs.
In the first place, as noted previously,57 the Court stated that
"at the very least" the use of fully distributed costs in the case is
"presumptively" in accord with section 15a(3). And in the second
place, the Court suggested that the use of fully distributed costs is
in some sense mandatory under the section. Thus, the Court declared that "nothing we say here should be taken as expressing
51.
52.
58.
54.
55.
56.
57.

892
892
392
892
892
892

U.S. at 582.
U.S. at 590.
U.S. at 590.

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
St:i: text

at 591. Docket No. 84018, supra note 3, is discussed in note 18 supra.
at 597.
at 588.
accompanying note 51 supra.
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any view as to the extent that § 15a(3) constitutes a categorical command to the ICC to use fully distributed costs as the only measure
of inherent advantage in intermodal rate controversies."158 This language is confusing because "categorical" normally signifies "absolute."159 Either section 15a(3) constitutes a categorical-i.e., absolute
----command or it does not. It appears reasonable to assume that the
Court did not use "categorical" in the word's correct sense, but that
it intended to give fully distributed costs some sanction as the criterion of inherent advantage.
In contrast with this generally favorable view of fully distributed
costs, the Court was consistently critical of the use of out-of-pocket
costs, both as a measure of inherent advantage and as a basis for
establishing minimum rates for meeting intermodal competition. It
characterized the district court's holding that section 15a(3) normally
requires out-of-pocket costs to be the standard of inherent advantage
as a "fallacy ..• [that] renders the terms 'inherent advantage' essentially meaningless in the context of the language and history of
§ 15a(3)."60 The Court further declared that there was "considerable
force" in the argument that "permitting the railroads to price on an
out-of-pocket basis to meet competition would result in the eventual
complete triumph of the railroads in intermodal competition because
of their ability to impose all their constant costs on traffic for which
there was no competition."61 And, after discussing at length the
testimony of economists in support of a discriminatory rate structure,
the Court concluded: "The simple fact is that § 15a(3) was not
enacted, as the railroads claim, to enable them to price their services
in such a way as to obtain the maximum [net] revenue therefrom." 62
The Commission's "initial determination" of the criterion of
cost advantage must now await the conclusion of the rule-making
proceedings Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Proceedings, Docket
Number 34013 (Sub-Number 1).63 In the original Docket Number
58. 392 U.S. at 590.
59. II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 180 (1933 ed.) defines "categorical" as "[a]sserting
absolutely or positively; not involving a condition or hypothesis; unqualified,"
60. 392 U.S. at 581.
61. 392 U.S. at 585-86. In a discriminatory rate structure, price varies with demand
elasticity in order to achieve maximum net revenue. See pt. II. B. I. infra.
62. 392 U.S. at 589.
63. The rule-making proceeding entitled Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Proceedings, Docket No. 34013 (Sub-No. 1), was initiated on February 5, 1969. See note 18
supra.
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34013, the Commission introduced the terms "variable costs" and
"fully allocated costs" to describe the cost levels that had previously
been identified as "out-of-pocket costs" and "fully distributed costs,"
respectively. 64 Both of these new terms exclude "profit, income taxes,
and for railroads, the passenger and less-than-carload deficits." 65
Since fully allocated costs exclude these noncost elements, they are
less objectionable from the standpoint of economic principle than
are fully distributed costs. Similarly, the Commission's statement
that " 'variable costs' ... is ... more descriptive [than out-of-pocket
costs] of all the unit expenses properly associated with particular
changes in output"66 indicates that the new concept is an improvement on "out-of-pocket" costs. Because the new and old terms are
basically equivalent, the Supreme Court's dicta in Ingot Molds favoring fully distributed costs are applicable to fully allocated costs and
its criticisms of out-of-pocket cost are applicable to variable costs.
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if the Commission in
Docket Number 34013 (Sub-Number 1) adopts fully allocated costs
as the criterion of cost advantage, the Court is likely to approve that
decision, at least in the circumstances of Ingot Molds. What the Court
would do if the Commission reverses its predilection for full costs
and decides that variable costs should be the proper standard is more
difficult to predict. In Ingot Molds, the Court could have reasonably
found that the issue of inherent advantage was before it, and it
could have unequivocally affirmed the Commission's use of fully
distributed costs. The fact that the Court left the issue undecided
pending the Commission's "initial determination" indicates that it
might approve variable costs, or even some other conception of cost
advantage, if such a standard should be adopted by the Commission.
II.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

In determining which criterion of cost advantage to adopt, the
Commission and the Court will need to consider the relevant economic issues. These issues can best be dealt with as two separate
questions: What criterion of cost advantage is most likely to bring
about an efficient allocation of resources? What rate-making principles are consistent with such a criterion?
64. 337 I.C.C. at 324.
65. 337 I.C.C. at 326.
66. 337 I.C.C. at 325.
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A The Appropriate Criterion
Three possible criteria of cost advantage-fully allocated costs,
variable costs, and marginal costs-require discussion. Fully allocated
cost is an inappropriate criterion because it includes an arbitrary
apportionment of joint and common (overhead) costs-costs that are
not directly associated with the particular services that are in controversy under section 15a(3).67 Since these costs are incurred whether
or not the services are produced, they do not measure the economic
cost of specific services and cannot properly serve as a criterion of
cost advantage.
From the standpoint of economic principle, the Commission's
conception of variable cost68 is almost as objectionable as is fully
allocated cost. For, according to the Commission, variable costlike fully allocated cost-"represents a level of expense which includes, among other things, an apportionment of joint or common
expenses which, in fact, are not necessarily incurred as a direct result of a particular movement [of traffic]." 69 Thus, the only difference
between the Commission's variable cost and fully allocated cost is
that the latter includes a larger element of uneconomic cost; in
principle they are similarly defective.
Marginal cost is by definition free of this economic defect because
it excludes any arbitrary apportionment of joint or common costs.
Marginal cost may be defined as the additional cost associated directly with the production of the particular service.70 Since a carrier
does not incur marginal cost unless an additional service is produced,
such cost is avoidable. Marginal cost is measured by the value of
the additional resources consumed in the production of the additional service. Under a marginal-cost standard, the carrier employing
the least valuable set of resources in furnishing services must necessarily be regarded as having the cost advantage.
67. The Commission specifically defines joint or common costs as those "expenses
which are incurred on behalf of a production process yielding two or more kinds of
output." 337 I.C.C. at 428.
68. The ICC defines variable costs as "unit-costs of output which change with
changes in the volume of output." 337 I.C.C. at 428.
69. 337 I.C.C. at 324. Contrary to economic principle, the Commission associates
variable costs with a time period that it has not yet determined. 337 I.C.C. at ?26. It is
difficult to understand the relevance of cost variations over a period of time in fixing
rates for particular services. For the economic nature of cost variability, or rather cost
elasticity, see Borts, Increasing Returns in the Railway Industry, 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 816
(1954).
70. R:. l.EnwICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM: AND R.F.sOURCE A.u.oCA.TION 148 (rev. ed. 1960).
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B. Rate-Making Method
Marginal-cost pricing is obviously consistent with the use of
marginal cost as the criterion of cost advantage. It also meets the
pricing requirement of welfare economic theory. 71 But marginal-cost
pricing in transport would fail to cover full costs, which a carrier
must recover in order to stay in business. What is needed is a secondbest method of rate-making, one which approximates more closely
than any other method the economic advantages of marginal-cost
pricing and, insofar as possible, returns full costs. Two methods have
been proposed. One provides for discriminatory rates, and the other
provides for rates equal to marginal cost plus a uniform increment.

I. Rate Discrimination
While the railroads accept marginal cost as the criterion of cost
advantage, they argue for discriminatory rates. They propose that
marginal cost "set the lower boundary (and demand considerations
and regulation the upper boundary) within which pricing decisions
should be made." 72 Their proposal would refer to marginal cost
in order to determine "the specific rate which will provide maximum
contribution to the overhead burden and thus to net income."73
This proposal is clearly equivalent to third-degree discrimination
designed to maximize earnings.74
71. "Welfare economics" bas been defined as "the branch of economic science that
attempts to establish and apply criteria of propriety to economic policies." M. REDER,
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 13 (1947). The choice of acceptable
criteria is the crux of welfare economics. Welfare economics is distinguished from
positive economics by the latter's exclusive concern with cause and effect relationships
with no attempt to establish criteria for economic policies. J. HADAR, ELEMENTARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 14 (1966). For the role of marginal-cost pricing in
welfare economic theory, see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A
MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 206 (1958); A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL ch. 6
(1944); M. REDER, supra at 49; T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPE'llTION 165 (1951).
72. Baumol, supra note 4, at 362.
73. Id.
74. For the conventional analysis of third-degree discrimination, see J. ROBINSON,
THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT CoMPETITION ch. 15 (1936). This analysis postulates the
production of a single homogeneous product (service), a uniform marginal-cost curve,
and several markets that are separated according to differences in demand elasticity.
Prices differ as elasticity differs, and net revenue is maximized when marginal revenue
is the same in all markets. In reality, however, the railroads furnish multiple services,
and it may well be that the relevant economic model should include separate marginalcost curves associated with each of the services rather than a uniform marginal-cost
curve. Bailey, Price and Output Determination by a Firm Selling Related Products,
44 AM. ECON. REv. 82 (1954). For a firm producing multiple products with a uniform
marginal-cost curve, the Robinson analysis bas been extended by Eli ·w. Clemens in
Price Discrimination and the Multiple Product Firm, 29(1) REv. EcoN. STUDIES 1

(1950-51).
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Rate discrimination is not consistent with the use of marginal
cost as the criterion of cost advantage, because discriminatory rates
are primarily governed by demand rather than by cost. Rate discrimination employs marginal cost merely as a "guide" to maximize
net earnings. Under discrimination, the level of rates and differences
in rates are admittedly determined by differences in demand elasticity, not by differences in marginal cost. It has been observed that
"[b]asing rates on demand (as well as on incremental costs) to attain
the maximum contributions means . . • that rates for all services
will not be the same either absolutely, or in relation to cost, or in
contribution to the net income of the carriers." 76 A rate structure
characterized by differences in rates unrelated to differences in cost
cannot approximate the economic advantages of marginal-cost pricing.
The railroads, nonetheless, argue that rate discrimination is in
both the public and their own interest. Rate discrimination is clearly
in the interest of the railroads because it is designed to maximize
their earnings. They claim it is also in the public interest because it
"can foster more efficient use of railroad resources and capacity and
can therefore lower costs and rates.'' 76 This claim is of doubtful validity. In the first place, present railroad resources probably reflect
excess capacity,77 and hence correct economic policy and the public
interest require disinvestment rather than increased use. In the second place, no proof is presented that increased traffic will necessarily lower marginal costs, which are the only factor that should be
relevant for rate-making. The railroads do not identify the rates that
"can" be lowered. It is reasonable to assume that the reference to
lower rates relates to rates in markets with inelastic demand and that
these rates are therefore high relative to marginal cost. But even if
both traffic and net income increase under discrimination, the railroads will not reduce such rates as long as their aggregate earnings
75. Baumol, supra note 4, at 363 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 365-66.
On the assumption that the third-degree model applies, it has been demonstrated
that discrimination will not necessarily lower costs or rates (nor even increase output)
as compared with simple monopoly or average-cost pricing. Miller, Decreasing Average
Cost and the Theory of Railroad Rates, 41 S. EcoN. J. 390 (1935). It is clear that the
same results follow if multiple products are associated with a uniform marginal-cost

curve. And substantially the same results follow if separate marginal-cost curves are
introduced. See note 74 supra.
77. The wave of recent railroad mergers suggests such excess capacity, since elimination of excess facilities is usually one of the prime objectives of mergers. M. CoNANT,
RAILROAD MERGERS AND .ABANDONMENTS ch. IV (1964).
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are considered inadequate, and they are likely to be so considered
in the foreseeable future. 78
It may still be argued that rate discrimination is in the public
interest because it is good for the railroads and what is good for the
railroads is in the public interest. But a discriminatory-rate structure
fashioned to maximize railroad earnings may result in a maldistribution of resources. In effect, such a structure imposes a tax on some
producers and areas while extending a bounty to others. In this
manner it may discourage efficiency in resource allocation and encourage inefficiency. Especially since the railroads do not deny this
possibility,70 it is clear that a discriminatory-rate structure is contrary to the public interest.

2. lviarginal Cost Plus a Uniform Increment
The least objectionable method of fixing rates for particular
services subject to intermodal competition is to add a uniform increment to the marginal costs of competing modes of transport. 80
It can easily be employed in the three situations that differ in respect of cost behavior.
In the situation that is most difficult to deal with from a regulatory standpoint, one mode (A) has the lower marginal cost but a
competing mode (B) has the lower fully allocated cost. 81 Under the
proposed method, A's rate would equal A's fully allocated cost and
B's rate the sum of B's marginal cost and an increment equal to the
difference benveen A's marginal cost and A's fully allocated cost.
Under the policy expressed by the Commission in Ingot Molds, B's
rate would equal B's fully allocated cost and A's rate would exceed
78. In the decade 1959-1968, the rate of return experienced by class I railroads of
the United States ranged from 1.97% in 1961 to 3,9% in 1966. The rate was related to
investment after depreciation, the lowest usable rate base. AssocIATION OF AMERICAN
RAILROADS, RAILROAD REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 7 (1970). More recent trends are even less
encouraging. For the twelve months ended September 30, 1970, the rate of return was
1.77%. Association of American Railroads, Information Letter No. 1939, Nov. 4, 1970.
79. Baumol, Clarification, supra note 4, at 349.
so. J. SARGENT, BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICY ch. 4 (1958); Vickrey, Some Implications
of Marginal Cost Pricing for Public Utilities, 67 AM. EcoN. AssN.-PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS, 45 A1.r. ECON. REv. 605 (1958).
81. This situation is identical to that in Ingot Molds, if the assumption is made
that the mode having the lower out-of-pocket cost also has the lower marginal cost.
Here it can be argued that it would be preferable to set B's rates at B's marginal cost
times the ratio of A's fully distributed (average) cost to A's marginal cost. Equal
proportionality between prices and marginal cost may be a better approximation to
the standard welfare optimum conditions. On the other hand, the uniform increment
has the advantage of simplicity.
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B's fully allocated cost in a measure calculated to enable B at least
to share in the traffic. But after New Haven, the Commission would
not prescribe a rate for A above A's fully allocated cost.82 In any
event, A would be barred from establishing a rate reflecting its
superior efficiency, which is indicated by its lower marginal cost.
In the second situation, A's marginal and fully allocated costs are
both lower than B's. The proposal suggested here would be to
prescribe rates precisely in the same manner as in the preceding case.
In some circumstances it may be desirable to fix B's rate at B's fully
allocated cost. In that event, the mode having the lower marginal
cost would still have the lower rate, and a measure of flexibility
would be afforded. Under the Commission's present policy, B's rate
would exceed A's by a margin computed to enable A to participate
in the traffic at rates covering A's fully allocated costs. Again B's
maximum rate would equal B's fully allocated cost; but B's rate
would not be designed by the Commission to reflect the measure
of A's marginal-cost superiority.
Finally, in the third situation, the two modes' marginal costs are
equal but A's fully allocated costs are higher than B's. The addition
of a uniform increment to the marginal costs of both A and B would
result in equal rates. Again it may be found preferable at times
to provide £or flexibility by establishing rates £or A and B at the
fully allocated cost of each. But since marginal costs are equal, there
is less justification £or unequal rates than in the preceding cases.
Here again the Commission would require A's rate to be at a level
that would enable B to obtain traffic at rates covering its fully allocated cost but that would not be above A's fully allocated cost.
Such rates would fail to indicate the equal efficiency of the competing modes.
Under a system of discriminatory rates, all that can be said is
that marginal cost would serve as the minimum in all three situations. The margin by which the precise rate would exceed that
minimum would depend upon the character of the demand £or the
service. In markets where demand is relatively elastic because of
severe intermodal competition, the margin would be small and rates
relatively low; in markets where demand is inelastic because of the
absence of such competition, the margin would be large and rates
relatively high. Thus, rates would reflect neither differences in marginal cost not the relative efficiency of competing modes.
82. See note 28 supra.
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In all three situations, establishment of rates at the level of
marginal cost plus a uniform increment would be consistent with
a marginal-cost standard of cost advantage, because such rates would
reflect differences in marginal cost. At the same time, the rates
would tend to recover full costs. Since such rates would have the
additional merit of departing only slightly from the conventional
application of full cost in rate-making, they would maintain substantial continuity in the Commission's policy.

III. SUMMARY
The principal legal issue in section 15a(3) rate-making proceedings involving intermodal competition concerns the determination
of the proper criterion for calculating inherent cost advantage; the
principal economic issues encompass the same search for the proper
criterion and also cognate rate-making principles.
The legal issue has been argued before the Supreme Court in
two cases, but the Court found both times that it was not necessary
to decide the issue, because the Commission had not made an "initial determination" of cost advantage. There is, however, a difference
between the relevant dicta in the two cases. In New Haven, the Court
indicated no preference between fully distributed costs (now fully
allocated costs) and out-of-pocket costs (now variable costs) and
even said that the appropriate measure of cost advantage "may be"
neither.83 In Ingot :Molds, however, the Court clearly favored fully
distributed costs. 84 It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if the
Commission should make an intial determination in favor of fully
allocated cost as the standard of cost advantage, the Court would
approve. It is less likely, but still probable, that the Court would
approve a determination by the Commission that variable cost is
the proper criterion. It is, however, unlikely that the Court would
interpret section 15a(3) as a "categorical demand" to adopt either
fully distributed costs or out-of-pocket costs, or any other standard.
According to economic principle, marginal cost is the correct
standard because it measures the social value of resources used in
performing the particular services in controversy under section
15a(3). But simply equating rates with marginal cost is impracticable
because such rates would normally fail to cover a carrier's full costs.
Discriminatory rates, designed to maximize net income, are not
consistent with a marginal-cost standard, because they are governed
83. ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744, 760 (1963).
84. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
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primarily not by cost but by demand. Furthermore, they may distort
resource allocation and are therefore not in the public interest.
Rates calculated as the sum of marginal cost and a uniform increment are consistent with a marginal-cost standard and tend to cover
fully allocated costs. 0£ all practicable proposals, therefore, only this
method of rate calculation is consistent with marginal cost as the
criterion of cost advantage and is in the public interest.

